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Resource Allocation and Firm Scope


Guido Friebel


Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Michael Raith


Simon Business School, University of Rochester

August 2007

Simon School Working Paper No. FR 06-16

Abstract:     
We develop a theory of firm scope based on the benefits and costs of resource allocation within firms. Integrating two firms into one makes it possible to allocate by authority scarce resources that are costly to trade. But to do so efficiently, top management must rely on information that is communicated by self-interested division managers. Two countervailing effects influence the design of optimal incentive contracts: first, intra-firm competition for scarce resources strengthens the incentives of division managers to expend effort on creating profitable projects. Second, a manager who is paid for his own division's performance has an incentive to overstate the quality of his project, which can be corrected only by paying for firm performance as well. We show that the second effect dominates, leading to overall higher costs of providing incentives in an integrated firm, relative to stand-alone firms. Integration thus creates new agency costs that are directly related to its benefits. We derive predictions about when two firms are likely to integrate, and about the optimal structure and incentives contracts in the integrated firm. In particular, we show why it is optimal to separate the tasks of allocating resources and running a division.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Theory of the firm, coordination, authority, incentives, strategic information transmission, hierarchy

JEL Classification: D23, D82, L22, M52

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Date posted: June 5, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Friebel, Guido and Raith, Michael, Resource Allocation and Firm Scope (August 2007). Simon School Working Paper No. FR 06-16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=906126 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.906126

Contact Information

Guido Friebel (Contact Author)
Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )
Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Michael Raith
Simon Business School, University of Rochester ( email )
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
585-275-8380 (Phone)
585-273-1140 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://works.bepress.com/michael_raith/
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