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The Effect of Attorney Compensation on the Timing of Settlements

Eric Helland
Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance; RAND

Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Law School


June 1, 2006

1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper

Abstract:     
Using Federal Judicial Center data on class action settlements, we find that plaintiffs' lawyers who expect to be compensated using the lodestar, or hourly fee, method systematically delay settlement to accrue additional fees. Plaintiffs' attorneys who expect to be compensated on a percentage basis of any settlement or award, on the other hand, settle their cases more quickly as predicted by the Spier (1992) settlement model. These results cast doubt on the potential for lodestar calculations to police the conduct of plaintiffs' lawyers in class actions.

Keywords: Class Action, Lodestar, Attorney Fees, Judges, Lawyers

JEL Classifications: K00, K42, J22, D82

Working Paper Series

Date posted: June 05, 2006 ; Last revised: June 05, 2006

Suggested Citation

Helland, Eric A. and Klick, Jonathan, The Effect of Attorney Compensation on the Timing of Settlements (June 1, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=906154


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Contact Information

Jonathan Klick (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Eric A. Helland
Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )
500 E. Ninth St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States
909-607-7275 (Phone)
909-621-8243 (Fax)
RAND ( email )
Santa Monica, CA United States
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