Abstract

 
 

References (9)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



The Effect of Attorney Compensation on the Timing of Settlements


Eric Helland


Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance; RAND

Jonathan Klick


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

June 1, 2006

1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper

Abstract:     
Using Federal Judicial Center data on class action settlements, we find that plaintiffs' lawyers who expect to be compensated using the lodestar, or hourly fee, method systematically delay settlement to accrue additional fees. Plaintiffs' attorneys who expect to be compensated on a percentage basis of any settlement or award, on the other hand, settle their cases more quickly as predicted by the Spier (1992) settlement model. These results cast doubt on the potential for lodestar calculations to police the conduct of plaintiffs' lawyers in class actions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Class Action, Lodestar, Attorney Fees, Judges, Lawyers

JEL Classification: K00, K42, J22, D82

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: June 5, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Helland, Eric A. and Klick, Jonathan, The Effect of Attorney Compensation on the Timing of Settlements (June 1, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=906154 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.906154

Contact Information

Eric A. Helland
Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )
500 E. Ninth St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States
909-607-7275 (Phone)
909-621-8243 (Fax)
RAND ( email )
1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA
United States
Jonathan Klick (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 667
Downloads: 136
Download Rank: 106,389
References:  9
Citations:  1

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.562 seconds