Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=906206
 
 

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Arbitrator Compromise in Final Offer Arbitration: Evidence from Major League Baseball


Daniel R. Marburger


Arkansas State University


Economic Inquiry, Vol. 42, Issue 1, pp. 60-68, 2004

Abstract:     
This article presents evidence that the preferred awards of arbitrators in final-offer arbitration (FOA) compromise between the perspectives of the bargainers. Using Major League Baseball FOA offers between 1986-2002, this study finds strong evidence that final offers (which are strategically formulated around the preferred award) are a weighted average of the player`s salary in the previous season and the average free agent salary. The findings are particularly interesting because FOA was created to eliminate arbitrator compromise. (JEL J520, L830)

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: February 29, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Marburger, Daniel R., Arbitrator Compromise in Final Offer Arbitration: Evidence from Major League Baseball. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 42, Issue 1, pp. 60-68, 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=906206

Contact Information

Daniel R. Marburger (Contact Author)
Arkansas State University ( email )
Box 4181
State University, AR 72467-115
United States
870-972-3416 (Phone)
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