First Author Conditions
University of Virginia - Department of Economics
Joshua S. Gans
University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER
Rice University - Department of Economics; Australian National University
Stephen P. King
Monash University - Department of Economics; Productivity Commission
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the persistent use of alphabetical name-orderings on academic papers in economics. In a context where market participants are interested in evaluating the relative individual contribution of authors, it is an equilibrium for papers to use alphabetical ordering. Moreover, it is never an equilibrium for authors always to be listed in order of relative contribution. In fact, we show via an example that the alphabetical name-ordering norm may be the unique equilibrium, although, multiple equilibria are also possible. Finally, we characterize the welfare properties of the noncooperative equilibrium and show it to produce research of lower quality than is optimal and than would be achieved if co-authors were forced to use name-ordering to signal relative contribution.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
JEL Classification: A11, D21
Date posted: June 28, 1998
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