Counterterrorism Cooperation and the Silver Bullet: A Game Theory Illustration

Abstract:     
This article uses game theory analysis to address bilateral counterterrorism cooperation and the sharing of intelligence, national security areas where there is a tendency to oversimplify the issues at stake. Contrary to widespread belief, the sharing of terrorism-related intelligence between allied nations is not simply a matter of having the political will that leads to make a decision to cooperate. Instead, a refusal to share sensitive intelligence often reflects a rational decision, one based on accurate assessments and the legitimate need to protect national sovereignty. This article illustrates this dilemma, using the tools of game theory to show how the rational equilibrium will be joint non-cooperation. From there, it offers some institutional changes designed to alter the players' calculus and lead to a cooperative equilibrium. These changes are realistic, and similar to the negotiations that occurred between the United States and Canada in an important terrorist financing case that was successfully prosecuted in Charlotte, North Carolina. The article concludes with a discussion of how these lessons can be institutionalized to maximize bilateral cooperation and intelligence sharing between countries.

Keywords: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, National Security, International Relations, Intelligence

Working Paper Series