Competition, Monopoly and Aftermarkets
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
Dennis W. Carlton
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 10-06
Consider a durable goods producer that potentially has market power in the aftermarkets associated with its own products. An important question is to what extent, if any, should the antitrust laws restrict the firm's behavior in these aftermarkets? In this paper we explore three models that illustrate how various behaviors that hurt competition in aftermarkets can, in fact, be efficient responses to potential inefficiencies that can arise in aftermarkets. Our results should give courts pause before intervening in aftermarkets.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Date posted: June 13, 2006
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