Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=908673
 
 

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'But, Mom, All the Other Kids Have One!' - CEO Compensation and Director Networks


Amir Barnea


HEC Montreal

Ilan Guedj


Analysis Research Planning Corporation (ARPC)

June 1, 2006

McCombs Business Research Paper No. FIN-04-06
1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper

Abstract:     
This paper explores how networks of directors affect CEO compensation. We find that firms that have more connected board members, and whose board members are connected to better connected firms award their CEOs a higher compensation. Controlling for firm size, investment opportunities, industry, and performance, a CEO of a firm which is in the top quintile of connected firms receives a 10% higher salary and a 13% higher total compensation than a CEO of a firm which is in the bottom quintile of connected firms. These results are robust to alternative explanations such as interlocked boards, busy boards, and entrenched boards; they are also robust to the independence of the board, geographic location of the firm, different governance measures, and potentially unobserved CEO or firm characteristics. These results highlight the important role that board networks play in the decision to compensate a CEO.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Executive compensation, Networks, Directors, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G3, G34, K22, L14

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Date posted: June 14, 2006 ; Last revised: March 17, 2009

Suggested Citation

Barnea, Amir and Guedj, Ilan, 'But, Mom, All the Other Kids Have One!' - CEO Compensation and Director Networks (June 1, 2006). McCombs Business Research Paper No. FIN-04-06; 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=908673 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.908673

Contact Information

Amir Barnea
HEC Montreal ( email )
3000 Chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine
Montreal, Quebec H3T 2A7
Canada
514-340-7321 (Phone)
514-340-5632 (Fax)
Ilan Guedj (Contact Author)
Analysis Research Planning Corporation (ARPC) ( email )
1220 19th Street, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20036
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.arpc.com/about/leadership/ilan-guedj-phd
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