'But, Mom, All the Other Kids Have One!' - CEO Compensation and Director Networks
Bates White, LLC
June 1, 2006
McCombs Business Research Paper No. FIN-04-06
1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
This paper explores how networks of directors affect CEO compensation. We find that firms that have more connected board members, and whose board members are connected to better connected firms award their CEOs a higher compensation. Controlling for firm size, investment opportunities, industry, and performance, a CEO of a firm which is in the top quintile of connected firms receives a 10% higher salary and a 13% higher total compensation than a CEO of a firm which is in the bottom quintile of connected firms. These results are robust to alternative explanations such as interlocked boards, busy boards, and entrenched boards; they are also robust to the independence of the board, geographic location of the firm, different governance measures, and potentially unobserved CEO or firm characteristics. These results highlight the important role that board networks play in the decision to compensate a CEO.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: Executive compensation, Networks, Directors, Corporate Governance
JEL Classification: G3, G34, K22, L14
Date posted: June 14, 2006 ; Last revised: March 17, 2009
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