Virtual Property: Protecting Bits in Context

47 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2006

See all articles by Michael Meehan

Michael Meehan

Stanford Law School; Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP

Abstract

Magical swords, space ships, enchanted scrolls, and other items used in massively-multiplayer online games are the objects of over $30 million dollars in sales in the United States each year and over $100 million worldwide. Amazingly, a virtual island, featuring castles, beaches, and mutants, sold for $26,500, and a virtual space station located "amidst the treacherous but Mineral Rich Paradise V Asteroid Belt" sold for $100,000. The involved game players arguably have purchased the right to use these items within the context of the game. One is left to ponder, however, whether the game players have any other legal rights to the virtual property and, if they do, how those rights are balanced against the rights of the companies providing the games. Given game players' economic stake in virtual property, scholars believe that virtual property disputes will arise between players and game companies notwithstanding the restrictive and ostensibly governing terms of the games' End-User License Agreements (EULAs). This paper argues, as suggested by other scholars, that the terms of the EULAs that deny players any rights to virtual property might be held unenforceable. If the players are granted rights to virtual property by the courts, then there remains a question as to the scope and content of those rights. This paper suggests a framework for conceptualizing virtual property rights and proposes default rules for balancing the rights of game players and game companies.

Keywords: Virtual Property, game, contract law, property law, EULA, TOU, end-user license agreement

JEL Classification: K12, K11, K30, K40

Suggested Citation

Meehan, Michael, Virtual Property: Protecting Bits in Context. Richmond Journal of Law and Technology, Fall 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=908924

Michael Meehan (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP

1717 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
United States

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