Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=909251
 
 

References (28)



 


 



Political Dynasties


Ernesto Dal Bo


University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business - Business and Public Policy

Pedro Dal Bo


Brown University - Department of Economics

Jason Snyder


University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business - Business and Public Policy

May 26, 2006


Abstract:     
We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the self-perpetuation of political elites, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We find that the percentage of dynastic legislators is decreasing over time and that dynastic legislators have been significantly more prevalent in the South, the Senate and the Democratic party. While regional and party differences have largely disappeared over time, the difference across chambers has not. We document differences and similarities in the profile and political careers of dynastic politicians relative to the rest of legislators. We also find that legislators that enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. Finally, we find that increases in political competition are associated with fewer dynastic legislators, suggesting that dynastic politicians may be less valued by voters.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: Political elites, dynasties, self-perpetuation, political selection, legislatures.

JEL Classification: D70, J45, N41, N42

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: June 17, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Dal Bo, Ernesto and Dal Bo, Pedro and Snyder, Jason, Political Dynasties (May 26, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=909251 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.909251

Contact Information

Ernesto Dal Bo
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business - Business and Public Policy ( email )
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
Pedro Dal Bo (Contact Author)
Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )
64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-2953 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Pedro_Dal_Bo/
Jason Snyder
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business - Business and Public Policy ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,669
Downloads: 273
Download Rank: 57,721
References:  28

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.344 seconds