Patterns of Multi-Agent Land Conservation: Crowding In/Out, Agglomeration, and Policy
H. J. Albers
Oregon State University - Applied Economics/FES
Amy W. Ando
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics
Michael B. Batz
Resources for the Future
June 21, 2006
This paper explores the spatial equilibrium patterns of land conservation that derive from a game between land conservation agents who provide public goods. The shape of the conservation benefit function determines whether one agent's conservation crowds in/out conservation by the other agent. Value for contiguity of conservation can produce: "spatial attraction," more conservation, and spatially-strategic behavior. The level of social benefits attained in the game depends on budget constraints, game structure, and the similarity between agents' objectives. The paper uses this spatially-explicit game structure to analyze special cases including hot-spots, high-cost parcels, agglomeration bonuses, and localized land trusts.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40
Keywords: conservation, spatial, land use, game, crowding out
JEL Classification: Q24, Q28, R14working papers series
Date posted: June 22, 2006
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