Patterns of Multi-Agent Land Conservation: Crowding In/Out, Agglomeration, and Policy

Abstract:     
This paper explores the spatial equilibrium patterns of land conservation that derive from a game between land conservation agents who provide public goods. The shape of the conservation benefit function determines whether one agent's conservation crowds in/out conservation by the other agent. Value for contiguity of conservation can produce: "spatial attraction," more conservation, and spatially-strategic behavior. The level of social benefits attained in the game depends on budget constraints, game structure, and the similarity between agents' objectives. The paper uses this spatially-explicit game structure to analyze special cases including hot-spots, high-cost parcels, agglomeration bonuses, and localized land trusts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: conservation, spatial, land use, game, crowding out

JEL Classification: Q24, Q28, R14

working papers series