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The Fungibility of Damage Awards: Punitive Damage Caps and Substitution

Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law

Catherine M. Sharkey
New York University - School of Law


February 23, 2007

FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper No. 912256
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 298

Abstract:     
Conventional wisdom suggests that punitive damages are growing out of control. To stop juries from awarding blockbuster punitive damages, a number of states have passed caps to set a ceiling on the amount of punitives. In principle, if plaintiffs' attorneys and/or juries wish to circumvent such caps, they could simply increase the amount of compensatory damages awarded. To investigate this possibility, we examine data from the Civil Justice Surveys performed by the National Center for State Courts and present evidence in both difference-in-difference and triple differences frameworks that punitive damage caps are associated with an increase in compensatory damage awards. These results suggest that caps alone are a poor way to constrain damage awards.

Keywords: Tort Reform, Blockbuster Awards, Punitive Damages, Punitives, Juries, Litigation

JEL Classifications: K00, K13, K41

Working Paper Series

Date posted: June 27, 2006 ; Last revised: March 22, 2007

Suggested Citation

Klick, Jonathan and Sharkey, Catherine M., The Fungibility of Damage Awards: Punitive Damage Caps and Substitution (February 23, 2007). FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper No. 912256; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 298. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=912256


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Contact Information

Catherine M. Sharkey (Contact Author)
New York University - School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6729 (Phone)
Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam Netherlands
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