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The Division and Size of Gains from Liberalization in Service Networks


Keshab Bhattarai


University of Hull

John Whalley


University of Western Ontario - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Centre for International Governance and Innovation (CIGI)


Review of International Economics, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 348-361, August 2006

Abstract:     
If two disjoint country service networks involving a small and large country are connected as part of international liberalization in the presence of network externalities, the per capita gain for the small country from access to a large network will be large, and the per capita gain for the large country will be small. In contrast to goods, the benefits of liberalization in network-related services are more likely to be approximately equally divided between large and small countries than is true of trade in goods, where benefits accrue disproportionately to the small country. We also argue that non-cooperation in network-related services trade may involve more extreme retaliation than suggested for trade in goods by the optimal tariff literature, so that relative to a non-cooperative outcome, gains from liberalization in network-related services become larger than from liberalization in goods. We develop simple models which we use for numerical examples showing these points, along with an empirical implementation for global telecoms liberalization for the US, Europe, Canada, and the rest of the world using the framework developed in the paper. This shows similar proportional gains to regions, consistent with the theme of the paper that goods and services liberalization differ.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: June 28, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Bhattarai, Keshab R. and Whalley, John, The Division and Size of Gains from Liberalization in Service Networks. Review of International Economics, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 348-361, August 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=912568 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2006.00594.x

Contact Information

Keshab R. Bhattarai (Contact Author)
University of Hull ( email )
Cottingham Road
Hull
Hull HU6 7RX
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.hull.ac.uk/php/ecskrb
John Whalley
University of Western Ontario - Department of Economics ( email )
London, Ontario N6A 5B8
Canada
519-661-3509, ext. 83509 (Phone)
519-661-3666 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.uwo.ca/economics/faculty/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Centre for International Governance and Innovation (CIGI) ( email )
57 Erb Street West
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2
Canada
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  20
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