Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=914000
 
 

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Signaling a Lemon: The Decision Not to Cross-List and High Private Benefits of Control


Michal Barzuza


University of Virginia School of Law

David C. Smith


University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce

Elio Valladares


University of Virginia - Department of Economics

July 3, 2006


Abstract:     
This paper studies the effects of firms' decision to cross-list on the frequency of controlling block sales by their domestic peers. Our results show that the announcement of cross-listing is associated with a positive and significant change in the frequency of sales among firms that choose not to cross-list. Though this paper focuses on cross-listing, our results have implications for other decisions at the midstream stage of a firm's life such as adopting corporate governance terms, distributing dividends and raising capital.

Keywords: private benefits of control, signaling, cross-listing

JEL Classification: G32, G34, K22

working papers series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: January 20, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Barzuza, Michal and Smith, David C. and Valladares, Elio, Signaling a Lemon: The Decision Not to Cross-List and High Private Benefits of Control (July 3, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=914000

Contact Information

Michal Barzuza (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

David Carl Smith
University of Virginia (UVA) - McIntire School of Commerce ( email )
P.O. Box 400173
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4173
United States
Elio Valladares
University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States
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