Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=914106
 
 

References (26)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Disobedience and Authority


John G. Matsusaka


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business; USC Gould School of Law

Anthony M. Marino


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Jan Zabojnik


Queen's University - Department of Economics

June 2006

USC CLEO Research Paper No. C06-11

Abstract:     
This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking for another job, even if they have no better information than the principal. The allocation of authority thus depends on external market conditions as well as the information and agency problems emphasized in the literature. Evidence from a national survey of organizations shows that worker autonomy is related to separation costs as the theory predicts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: authority, delegation, incentives

JEL Classification: M50, D23, L22

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Date posted: July 14, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Matsusaka, John G. and Marino, Anthony M. and Zabojnik, Jan, Disobedience and Authority (June 2006). USC CLEO Research Paper No. C06-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=914106 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.914106

Contact Information

John G. Matsusaka (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
Department of Finance & Business Economics
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6495 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

USC Gould School of Law
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6495 (Phone)

Anthony M. Marino
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
Dept. of Finance & Business Economics
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6525 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)
Jan Zabojnik
Queen's University (Canada) - Department of Economics ( email )
94 University Avenue
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada
613-533-2275 (Phone)
613-533-6668 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/faculty/zabojnik/Page/
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References:  26
Citations:  3

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