Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=915403
 


 



Placing Election Bylaws on the Corporate Ballot


Lucian A. Bebchuk


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Allen Ferrell


Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Reinier Kraakman


Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute

Mark J. Roe


Harvard Law School

Guhan Subramanian


Harvard Business School

2005

Harvard PON Working Paper No. 915403

Abstract:     
This piece provides our amicus curiae brief in the case of American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees Pension Plan v. American International Group, which is now under consideration by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In this case, a shareholder submitted a proposal to amend the company's bylaws to require the company in certain circumstances to place candidates nominated by shareholders on the company's ballot, and the company sought to exclude this proposal from the ballot. We suggest in our amicus curiae brief that companies should not be allowed to exclude form the company ballot bylaw amendments concerning corporate elections. Prohibiting companies from doing so, we argue, is required by a reasonable interpretation of the proxy rules and necessary to advance the policy goals underlying the rules. As an appendix to the brief we attach a letter to the SEC sent by forty-eight law professors including ourselves that expresses a similar position.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: Corporate elections, shareholder voting, proxy contests, access to the ballot, by-laws, by-law amendments, proxy fights, proxy contests, corporate governance, agency costs

JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22

working papers series





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Date posted: July 10, 2006 ; Last revised: May 7, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Ferrell, Allen and Kraakman, Reinier and Roe, Mark J. and Subramanian, Guhan, Placing Election Bylaws on the Corporate Ballot (2005). Harvard PON Working Paper No. 915403. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=915403 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.915403

Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School ( email )
Griswold 303 1525 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 495-8961 (Phone)
(617) 495-1110 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Reinier H. Kraakman
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-3586 (Phone)
617-496-6118 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Mark J. Roe
Harvard Law School ( email )
Griswold 502
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8099 (Phone)
617-495-4299 (Fax)
Guhan Subramanian
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-9784 (Phone)
617-496-7379 (Fax)
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