Placing Election Bylaws on the Corporate Ballot
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute
Mark J. Roe
Harvard Law School
Harvard Business School
Harvard PON Working Paper No. 915403
This piece provides our amicus curiae brief in the case of American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees Pension Plan v. American International Group, which is now under consideration by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In this case, a shareholder submitted a proposal to amend the company's bylaws to require the company in certain circumstances to place candidates nominated by shareholders on the company's ballot, and the company sought to exclude this proposal from the ballot. We suggest in our amicus curiae brief that companies should not be allowed to exclude form the company ballot bylaw amendments concerning corporate elections. Prohibiting companies from doing so, we argue, is required by a reasonable interpretation of the proxy rules and necessary to advance the policy goals underlying the rules. As an appendix to the brief we attach a letter to the SEC sent by forty-eight law professors including ourselves that expresses a similar position.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 11
Keywords: Corporate elections, shareholder voting, proxy contests, access to the ballot, by-laws, by-law amendments, proxy fights, proxy contests, corporate governance, agency costs
JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22
Date posted: July 10, 2006 ; Last revised: May 7, 2009
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