Abstract

 
 

Citations



 


 



Market Access and Welfare under Free Trade Agreements: Textiles under nafta


Olivier Cadot


University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Céline Carrère


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Alberto Portugal-Pérez


University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics

2005

The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 379-405, 2005

Abstract:     
The effective market access granted to textiles and apparel under the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) is estimated, taking into account the presence of rules of origin. First, estimates are provided of the effect of tariff preferences combined with rules of origin on the border prices of Mexican final goods exported to the United States and of U.S. intermediate goods exported to Mexico, based on eight-digit Harmonized System tariff-line data. A third of the estimated rise in the border price of Mexican apparel products is found to compensate for the cost of complying with nafta`s rules of origin, and nafta is found to have raised the price of U.S. intermediate goods exported to Mexico by around 12 percent, with downstream rules of origin accounting for a third of that increase. Second, simulations are used to estimate welfare gains for Mexican exporters from preferential market access under nafta. The presence of rules of origin is found to approximately halve these gains.

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: February 29, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Cadot, Olivier, Carrère, Céline and Portugal-Pérez, Alberto, Market Access and Welfare under Free Trade Agreements: Textiles under nafta ( 2005). The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 379-405, 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=916905

Contact Information

Olivier Cadot (Contact Author)
University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )
Lausanne, 1018
Switzerland
+41 21 692 3463 (Phone)
+41 21 692 3495 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Céline Carrère
affiliation not provided to SSRN
No Address Available
Alberto Portugal-Pérez
University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics ( email )
40, boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Geneva 4, CH-1211
Switzerland
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 298

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.406 seconds