Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=917778
 
 

References (60)



 
 

Citations (5)



 


 



Businessman Candidates


Scott Gehlbach


University of Wisconsin-Madison; Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (CSID)

Konstantin Sonin


Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya


Paris School of Economics

June 24, 2010

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 718-736, July 2010

Abstract:     
Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that "businessman candidacy'' and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for office. When such institutions are weak, businessmen can subvert policy irrespective of whether they hold office, but they may run for office to avoid the cost of lobbying elected officials. Evidence from Russian gubernatorial elections supports the model's predictions. Businessman candidates emerge in regions with low media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises. Among regions with weaker institutions, professional politicians crowd out businessmen when the rents from office are especially large.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: businessman candidates, political selection, immature democracies, special interest politics, political connections

JEL Classification: D21, H11, O17

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: July 20, 2006 ; Last revised: June 24, 2010

Suggested Citation

Gehlbach, Scott and Sonin, Konstantin and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Businessman Candidates (June 24, 2010). American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 718-736, July 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=917778

Contact Information

Scott Gehlbach
University of Wisconsin-Madison ( email )
1050 Bascom Mall
Madison, WI 53706
United States
608-263-2391 (Phone)
Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (CSID)
Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, RI Moscow 119017
Russia
Konstantin Sonin
Higher School of Economics ( email )
20 Myasnitskaya street
Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya (Contact Author)
Paris School of Economics ( email )
48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,803
Downloads: 588
Download Rank: 24,291
References:  60
Citations:  5

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.313 seconds