SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Citations (2)

Beta

 


 



Agents Without Principals: the Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms

Evelyn Brody
Chicago-Kent College of Law



New York Law School Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 547-536, 1996

Abstract:     
Are nonprofit organizations 'different' from firms with owners? The accepted economic account holds that nonprofits are more trustworthy than business firms because nonprofits cannot distribute profits to owners. However, all firms, nonprofit or proprietary, have converged into similar patterns of behavior. Firms, whether nonprofit or proprietary (or even public), are subject to many of the same economic forces, such as resource dependency, institutional isomorphism, and organizational slack. Even in the absence of shareholders somebody still has to run the enterprise: to decide what objectives to pursue, and how; to manage its financial and human resources; and to span the boundaries of the organization in interacting with the key constituencies, other organizations, and the public. While nonprofits have shareholders privileged with rights of accountability, in most of the business sector shareholders have long lost effective control to firm management. In short, management in both sectors has decisional authority, whether de facto, as in the proprietary sector, or de jure, as in the nonprofit sector.

Moreover, the 'nondistribution constraint' cannot guarantee that the nonprofit operates better or worse than a proprietary enterprise in overcoming information asymmetries. The absence of shareholders demanding profits enables the organization to relax into productive inefficiencies, or to cross-subsidize activities the patron would not want to pay for (could she only observe them). Such inefficiencies or cross-subsidization might 'cost' more than the profits the enterprise might otherwise distribute to shareholders if it operated in a proprietary form. Separately, in an industry with more than one nonprofit, the nondistribution constraint cannot help patrons choose between competing nonprofits.

It might be difficult to find enough differences on other grounds to justify continued subsidies based on organizational form. Subsidies might need to be targeted to desired services, provided either in the nonprofit or for-profit sector.

Keywords: non-profit, proprietary

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: July 20, 2006 ; Last revised: October 13, 2008

Suggested Citation

Brody, Evelyn, Agents Without Principals: the Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms. New York Law School Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 547-536, 1996. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=918230


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Evelyn Brody (Contact Author)
Chicago-Kent College of Law ( email )
565 West Adams St.
Chicago, IL 60661
United States
312-906-5276 (Phone)
312-906-5280 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 574
Downloads: 227
Download Rank: 41,121
Citations: 2
People who downloaded
this paper also downloaded:

1. Challenges in Managing Nonprofit Organizations: A Research Overview
By Bernd Helmig, Marc Jegers, ...

Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apolloc 7 in 0.281 seconds.