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Probability ThresholdsJonathan S. MasurUniversity of Chicago - Law School April 4, 2006 Iowa Law Review, Vol. 92, May 2007 Abstract: Scholars and lower courts have traditionally operated under the belief that cases involving direct tradeoffs between free speech and national security call for the application of straightforward cost-benefit analysis. But the Supreme Court has refused to adhere to this approach, instead deciding difficult liberty-versus-security questions with reference to a “probability threshold” - a doctrinal floor defining how likely a potential threat must be in order to register in the constitutional calculus. This doctrinal innovation has served as a necessary corrective to what would otherwise be the systematic overestimation of speech-based threats driven by the interaction of two factors. First, distinct informational asymmetries favor the government, the putative censor. Second, courts and other lay risk analysts - through the exercise of bounded rationality - tend to overstate very low-probability, highly emotionally salient dangers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 65 Keywords: first amendment, probability, clear and present, behavioral law and economics, availability heuristic, cost-benefit, balancing, cognitive JEL Classification: K39 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: July 24, 2006 ; Last revised: February 24, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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