Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=920458
 
 

Citations (4)



 
 

Footnotes (216)



 


 



Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World


Michael L. Wachter


University of Pennsylvania Law School - Institute for Law and Economics

July 18, 2006

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 155, p. 581, 2007
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 06-17

Abstract:     
Union membership, as a percentage of the private sector workforce, has been in decline for 50 years. I argue that the cause of this unrelenting decline is due to a single fundamental factor - the change in the United States economy from a corporatist-regulated economy to one based on free competition. Most labor commentators have explained the decline by a confluence of unrelated economic and legal forces. In my approach, to understand the causes of the decline in union membership it is critical to return to the period of the original growth in union power; that is, to the New Deal. In examining the differences in the economy between today and the New Deal, one must look not only to labor law, but also to corporate law and antitrust. For unions to be successful, the goals of labor law need to be consistent with the goals of corporate law and antitrust. While the goals were consistent in the 1930s, they are in conflict today.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: Corporations, Economics, Employment Practice, Labor Law, Organizations, Antitrust, Labor Unions, Law and Economics, Union Membership

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 25, 2006 ; Last revised: April 6, 2009

Suggested Citation

Wachter, Michael L., Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World (July 18, 2006). University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 155, p. 581, 2007; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 06-17. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=920458

Contact Information

Michael L. Wachter (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School - Institute for Law and Economics ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7852 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,828
Downloads: 491
Download Rank: 31,363
Citations:  4
Footnotes:  216

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.250 seconds