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Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World

Michael L. Wachter
University of Pennsylvania Law School



University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 155, p. 581, 2007
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 06-17

Abstract:     
Union membership, as a percentage of the private sector workforce, has been in decline for 50 years. I argue that the cause of this unrelenting decline is due to a single fundamental factor - the change in the United States economy from a corporatist-regulated economy to one based on free competition. Most labor commentators have explained the decline by a confluence of unrelated economic and legal forces. In my approach, to understand the causes of the decline in union membership it is critical to return to the period of the original growth in union power; that is, to the New Deal. In examining the differences in the economy between today and the New Deal, one must look not only to labor law, but also to corporate law and antitrust. For unions to be successful, the goals of labor law need to be consistent with the goals of corporate law and antitrust. While the goals were consistent in the 1930s, they are in conflict today.

Keywords: Corporations, Economics, Employment Practice, Labor Law, Organizations, Antitrust, Labor Unions, Law and Economics, Union Membership

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: July 25, 2006 ; Last revised: April 06, 2009

Suggested Citation

Wachter, Michael L., Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World (July 18, 2006). University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 155, p. 581, 2007; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 06-17. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=920458


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Michael L. Wachter (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
215-898-7852 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)
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