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Why Shareholders Want their CEOs to Lie More after Dura Pharmaceuticals


James C. Spindler


University of Texas School of Law; McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin

July 21, 2006

USC CLEO Research Paper No. C06-10
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 06-16

Abstract:     
The Supreme Court's recent Dura Pharmaceuticals decision requires a plaintiff to show a market decline (ex post losses), as opposed to price inflation at the time of purchase (ex ante losses), in order to maintain an action for securities fraud. Since fraud is actionable only where a market decline attributable to the fraud occurs under the ex post loss rule, firms that can bundle together disclosures or business projects are under-deterred by the antifraud regime: the success of one project may compensate for the failure of another, the firm can time the release of good and bad news to mask fraud's effect on price, and other factors that would have caused a loss of investment value even without the fraud can disallow a claim for damages. Strategically, firms may bundle to minimize exposure to liability. On the other hand, firms that value transparency may wish to unbundle. In this sense, the credibility of disclosure under an ex post loss rule depends on the extent to which firms can and do unbundle, whereas an ex ante regime is theoretically perfect in any case. This analysis also reveals two additional problems with an ex post rule: market tests for ex post damages awards (a chief purported benefit) are generally not available for bundled firms, and awarding ex post damages may over-punish small frauds but reward big ones.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

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Date posted: July 25, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Spindler, James C., Why Shareholders Want their CEOs to Lie More after Dura Pharmaceuticals (July 21, 2006). USC CLEO Research Paper No. C06-10; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 06-16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=920470 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.920470

Contact Information

James C. Spindler (Contact Author)
University of Texas School of Law ( email )
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States

McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
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