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Sophisticated Discipline in Nascent Deposit Markets: Evidence from Post-Communist Russia


Alexei Karas


University College Roosevelt/Utrecht University; Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE)

William Pyle


Middlebury College - Department of Economics

Koen J. L. Schoors


Ghent University - Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE); Ghent University - Department of General Economics

June 2006

William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 829

Abstract:     
Using a database from post-communist, pre-deposit-insurance Russia, we demonstrate the presence of quantity-based sanctioning of weaker banks by both firms and households, particularly after the financial crisis of 1998. Evidence for the standard form of price discipline, however, is notably weak. Estimating the deposit supply function, we show that, particularly for poorly capitalized banks, interest rate increases exhibit diminishing, and eventually negative, returns in terms of deposit attraction, a finding consistent with depositors interpreting the deposit rate itself as a signal of otherwise unobserved bank-level risk.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: banking, market discipline, deposit market, transition, Russia

JEL Classification: G21, O16, P2

working papers series


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Date posted: August 3, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Karas, Alexei, Pyle, William and Schoors, Koen J. L., Sophisticated Discipline in Nascent Deposit Markets: Evidence from Post-Communist Russia (June 2006). William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 829. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=920676 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.920676

Contact Information

Alexei Karas
University College Roosevelt/Utrecht University ( email )
P.O. Box 94
NL-4331 CB Middelburg
Middelburg, NL-4330 AB
Netherlands
+31 118-655517 (Phone)
+31 118-655508 (Fax)
Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE) ( email )
Hoveniersberg 24
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
+32 92643480 (Phone)
+32 92643599 (Fax)
William Pyle (Contact Author)
Middlebury College - Department of Economics ( email )
Munroe Hall
Middlebury, VT 05753
United States
(802) 443-3240 (Phone)
Koen J. L. Schoors
Ghent University - Centre for Russian International Socio-Political and Economic Studies (CERISE) ( email )
Tweekerkenstraat 2
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
+32 9 264 34 78 (Phone)
+32 9 265 35 99 (Fax)
Ghent University - Department of General Economics ( email )
Tweekerkenstraat 2
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
+32 9 264 34 78 (Phone)
+32 9 264 35 99 (Fax)
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