Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate Transparency: Evidence from Indonesia
Harvard Business School, Strategy Unit
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Center for Financial Studies (CFS); University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center; CESifo Research Network
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 81, pp. 411-439, August 2006
This study examines the role of political connections in firms' financing strategies and their long-run performance. We view political connections as an example for domestic arrangements which can reduce the benefits of global financing. Using data from Indonesia, we find that firms with strong political connections are less likely to have publicly traded foreign securities. As a result, estimates of the performance consequences of foreign financing are severely biased if value-creating domestic arrangements such as political relationships are ignored. Connections not only alter firms' financing strategies, they also influence long-run performance. Tracking returns across several regimes, we show that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when their patron falls from power, leading closely connected firms to underperform under the new regime and subsequently to increase their foreign financing.
Keywords: Cross listing, Financing choices, Emerging markets, Asian financial crisis, Indonesia, Disclosure
JEL Classification: P16, G32, G38, K22, K42, M41, G18
Date posted: August 3, 2006
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