Cartel Fines in Europe - Law, Practice and Deterrence
Case Associates; Institute of Economic Affairs
World Competition, Vol. 29, March 2007
This paper examines the law, practice and evidence on fines for price-fixing under European competition law. It undertakes the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of fines imposed on cartels by the European Commission. Based on an analysis of 30 fully reported cartel decisions, and appeals against many of these, the paper looks at how fines are calculated in practice, and whether they reflect consumers' losses and are likely to deter price-fixing. It also examines the impact of the amended 2006 penalty guidelines.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: Price-fixing, cartel, fines, optimal deterrence, leniency
JEL Classification: L4
Date posted: August 1, 2006
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