Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards
Lisa M. Fairfax
George Washington University - Law School
Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 31, p. 381, 2005
U of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 921036
Commentators have argued that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or the "Act") raises federalism concerns because it regulates the internal affairs of a corporation, including the composition of, and qualifications for, corporate boards, in a manner traditionally reserved to states. This Article responds to those claims, arguing that the Act reflects a relatively minimal intrusion into state law, particularly with regard to issues of director independence. This Article further argues that the Act's failure to disturb state law on these issues may impede its ability to tighten director independence standards and by extension may undermine its ability to improve the quality of directors' monitoring of corporate behavior.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, federalism, corporate lawAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: July 31, 2006
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