Effects of Subordinate Likeability and Balanced Scorecard Format on Permformance-Related Judgments

39 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2006

See all articles by Steven E. Kaplan

Steven E. Kaplan

Arizona State University

Michael J. Petersen

Arizona State University (ASU) - School of Accountancy

Janet Samuels

Thunderbird School of Global Management

Date Written: July 2006

Abstract

Previous appraisal research has found that subordinate manager likeability biases appraisal related judgments (Cardy and Dobbins, 1986; Tsui and Barry, 1986; Turban et al., 1990). We investigate whether the format and structure of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) moderates subordinate likeability bias on evaluators' performance-related judgments (overall performance rating, strength of conviction in rating, and bonus money allocation). Following Lipe and Saltario (2002), we characterize the evaluation of subordinate managers using a multidimensional performance measurement system as a cognitively difficult task. We hypothesize that, in comparison to when a BSC format is not used, use of a BSC format fosters a 'divide-and-conquer' approach by evaluators and that the structure of the BSC will guide the application of this approach, which, in turn, is expected to mitigate the influence of subordinate likeability on evaluators' performance-related judgments. Unexpectedly, we find that the biasing effect of subordinate manager likeability on performance-related judgments is not moderated by the format and structure of the BSC. We also provide supplemental mediation analysis which demonstrates that likeability has a direct effect on bonus allocations in addition to the indirect effect it conveys through improved overall performance ratings.

Keywords: Performance Measurement, BSC, Affect, Likeability

JEL Classification: M41

Suggested Citation

Kaplan, Steven E. and Petersen, Michael J. and Samuels, Janet, Effects of Subordinate Likeability and Balanced Scorecard Format on Permformance-Related Judgments (July 2006). AAA 2007 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=921410 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.921410

Steven E. Kaplan (Contact Author)

Arizona State University ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287
United States
602-965-6498 (Phone)
602-965-8392 (Fax)

Michael J. Petersen

Arizona State University (ASU) - School of Accountancy ( email )

Tempe, AZ 85287
United States

Janet Samuels

Thunderbird School of Global Management ( email )

15249 N 59th Ave.
Glendale, AZ 85306
United States