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Evidence on Motivations for Downward Earnings ManagementBrad BadertscherUniversity of Notre Dame John D. PhillipsUniversity of Connecticut - Department of Accounting Morton PincusUniversity of California, Irvine Sonja O. RegoIndiana University - Kelley School of Business April 22, 2009 Abstract: We analyze a set of firms that restated earnings upward because of accounting irregularities and thus presumably had managed earnings downward. Our results are consistent with the restatement sample firms having managed earnings downward in their original financial statements to create cookie jar reserves, to depress share prices prior to corporate and insider stock purchases, and to minimize political costs. There is no evidence these firms managed earnings downward to reduce income taxes, which is consistent with tax-motivated downward earnings management being accomplished via real transactions that typically do not give rise to accounting irregularities. We estimate that taxable firms (i.e., profitable restatement sample firms without NOL carryforwards) left an average of 23 cents per dollar of pre-tax earnings management on the table by engaging in book-tax nonconforming downward earnings management. The forgone tax savings represent a lower bound on the incremental costs associated with real transactions management.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 51 Keywords: Earnings management, restatements, book-tax differences, book-tax conformity JEL Classification: M41, M43, H25, M49 working papers seriesDate posted: August 3, 2006 ; Last revised: June 11, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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