Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments
College of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University
July 27, 2006
ISER Discussion Paper No. 669
We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson et al. (1994). Moreover, we focus on pure exchange economies without free disposal, and try to construct another augmented revelation mechanism that satisfies balancedness in and out of equilibrium, and which implements all strategy-proof social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24
Keywords: Augmented Revelation Mechanism, Strategy-Proofness, Balancedness, Quasi-Strong-Non-Bossiness, The Revelation Principle
JEL Classification: D51, C72, D71, D78
Date posted: August 1, 2006
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