Delegation Really Running Riot
University of San Diego School of Law
University of Virginia School of Law
July 24, 2006
San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-54
Conventional delegations - statutes delegating Article I, section 8 authority - are familiar enough and have spawned a large literature regarding their constitutionality. Rather than discussing whether Congress may delegate these powers, we wish to shift the focus to delegation of other powers. Starting from the assumption that conventional delegations are constitution, we ask whether Congress may delegate other congressional power, such as those found in Articles II, III, and IV. For instance, we consider whether Congress may delegate the power to admit states and to propose amendments to the Constitution. We also consider whether Congress may delegate cameral authority, such as the House's ability to impeach and the Senate's ability to confirm nominations. Finally, we address whether the Congress may delegate powers to other entities and in the process circumvent or evade powers granted to other branches. We conclude that if one accepts the constitutionality of conventional delegations, one must likewise accept the constitutionality of all manner of unconventional delegations. If the Necessary and Proper clause permits the making of laws outside of the Article I, section 7 process, it likewise permits the approval of treaties outside the Article II, section 2 process. And the same is true for the other unconventional delegations we discuss here. In this way, the delegation of cameral and bicameral power can be a means for "altering," or at least evading, the structural Constitution's most notable features.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33
Keywords: delegation, necessary and proper, congress
JEL Classification: K1, K10working papers series
Date posted: August 2, 2006
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