Regulating Executive Remuneration: International Developments in the Post-Scandal Era
Jennifer G. Hill
University of Sydney - Faculty of Law; Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
ICFAI Journal of Corporate & Securities Law, 2006
Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-15
Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 06/10
European Company Law, Vol. 3, p. 64, 2006
The problem of executive compensation was an underlying theme in international corporate scandals epitomized by Enron in the US, Parmalat and Vivendi in Europe, and One.Tel in Australia. There has been a wide array of regulatory responses to these scandals across jurisdictions, with varying degrees of attention paid to the issue of executive pay.
This article examines recent international responses regarding executive pay through the lens of regulatory strategy. Specific reforms and developments discussed in the article include: enhanced compensation disclosure; increased shareholder participation; and judicial review of board decisions about executive pay in case law such as the Disney litigation in the US and the Mannesmann trial in Germany.
These regulatory developments concerning executive pay are interesting from the perspective of the convergence/persistence debate in comparative corporate governance. They show that major international scandals of this kind may generate new divergence in laws across jurisdictions.
This article is a revised and updated version of a paper published in early 2006 in European Company Law. This updated version (forthcoming, 2006, ICFAI Journal of Corporate & Securities Law) includes a Postscript, containing a detailed discussion of the 2006 Disney decision, delivered by Jacobs J. on behalf of the Supreme Court of Delaware on June 8, 2006.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 39
Keywords: executive compensation, remuneration, shareholders, directors, disclosure, directors' duties, comparative corporate governance, corporate scandals, regulation
JEL Classification: G30, G34, J33, K22, K33, K40, M14, M52, 016Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 8, 2006
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