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Services Policies in Transition Economies: On the European Union and the World Trade Organization as Commitment Mechanisms


Felix Eschenbach


Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Bernard Hoekman


Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

June 1, 2006

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3951

Abstract:     
The authors analyze the extent to which the EU-15 and 16 transition economies used the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to commit to service sector policy reforms. They compare GATS commitments with the evolution of actual policy stances over time. While there is substantial variance across transition economies on both actual policies and GATS commitments, the authors find an inverse relationship between the depth of GATS commitments and the quality of actual services policies as assessed by the private sector. In part this can be explained by the fact that the prospect of EU accession makes GATS less relevant as a commitment device for a subset of transition economies. But for many of the non-EU accession candidates, the WTO seems to be a weak commitment device. One explanation is that the small size of the markets concerned generates weak external enforcement incentives. The authors' findings suggest greater collective investment by WTO members in monitoring and the need for transparency to increase the benefits of WTO membership to small countries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Trade and Services, Trade Law, World Trade Organization, Trade and Regional Integration, Free Trade

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Date posted: August 9, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Eschenbach, Felix and Hoekman, Bernard, Services Policies in Transition Economies: On the European Union and the World Trade Organization as Commitment Mechanisms (June 1, 2006). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3951. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=923258

Contact Information

Felix Eschenbach (Contact Author)
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )
Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3062 PA Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands
+31 10 408 8924 (Phone)
+31 10 408 9146 (Fax)
Bernard Hoekman
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )
Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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