World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)
University of Maryland
Dean S. Karlan
Yale University; Innovations for Poverty Action; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
New York University (NYU) - Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service; New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics
July 1, 2006
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3959
Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform, Insurance&Risk Mitigation, Financial Intermediation, Social Accountability, Civic Participation and Corporate Governance
Date posted: November 21, 2006
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