Board Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control
David A. Becher
Drexel University - Department of Finance
Thomas W. Bates
Arizona State University - Department of Finance
Michael L. Lemmon
University of Utah - Department of Finance
HKUST Business School Research Paper No. 07-05
This paper considers the relation between board classification, takeover activity, and transaction outcomes for a panel of firms between 1990 and 2002. Target board classification does not change the likelihood that a firm, once targeted, is ultimately acquired. Moreover, shareholders of targets with a classified board realize bid returns that are equivalent to those of targets with a single class of directors, but receive a higher proportion of total bid surplus. Board classification does reduce the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid, however, the economic effect of bid deterrence on the value of the firm is quite small. Overall, the evidence is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that board classification is an anti-takeover device that facilitates managerial entrenchment.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: Classified Board, Staggered Board, Merger, Acquisition, Managerial Entrenchment
JEL Classification: G34working papers series
Date posted: August 10, 2006 ; Last revised: October 22, 2007
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