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Smithian Growth through Creative Organization


Patrick Legros


Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andrew F. Newman


Boston University - Department of Economics

Eugenio Proto


University of Warwick - Department of Economics

June 2006

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5709

Abstract:     
We consider an endogenous growth model in which appropriate organization fosters innovation, but because of contractibility problems, this benefit cannot be internalized. The organizational design element we focus on is the division of labour, which as Adam Smith argued, facilitates invention by observers of the production process. However, entrepreneurs choose its level only to facilitate monitoring their workers. Whether there is innovation and growth depends on the interaction of the markets for labour and for inventions. Because of a credit market imperfection, the relative scarcity of entrepreneurs and workers depends on the wealth distribution. A high level of specialization is chosen when the wage share is low, i.e. when there are few wealthy. But in this case there are also few entrepreneurs and a consequent small market for innovations, which discourages inventive activity. When there are many wealthy, the innovation market is large, but the rate of invention is low because there is little specialization. Sustained technological progress and economic growth therefore require only moderate levels of inequality. The model also suggests that the growth rate need not be monotonic in the "quality of institutions," such as the degree of credit market imperfection.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: Technical change, division of labour, organization theory

JEL Classification: O3

working papers series


Date posted: August 9, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Legros, Patrick, Newman, Andrew F. and Proto, Eugenio, Smithian Growth through Creative Organization (June 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5709. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=923457

Contact Information

Patrick Legros (Contact Author)
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )
Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
+32 2 650 4219/3 (Phone)
+32 2 650 4475 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Andrew F. Newman
Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )
270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-358-4354 (Phone)
617-353-4143 (Fax)
Eugenio Proto
University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
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