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The Limits of Self-Governance in the Presence of Spite: Experimental Evidence from Urban and Rural Russia

Simon Gaechter
University of Nottingham; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Benedikt Herrmann
University of Nottingham - School of Economics


July 2006

IZA Discussion Paper No. 2236

Abstract:     
We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is substantial spiteful punishment of high contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, spite undermines the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only.

Keywords: social norms, free riding, punishment, spite, experiments

JEL Classifications: H41, C91, D23, C72

Working Paper Series

Date posted: August 10, 2006 ; Last revised: August 10, 2006

Suggested Citation

Gaechter, Simon and Herrmann, Benedikt, The Limits of Self-Governance in the Presence of Spite: Experimental Evidence from Urban and Rural Russia (July 2006). IZA Discussion Paper No. 2236. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=923547


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Contact Information

Simon Gachter (Contact Author)
University of Nottingham ( email )
University Park
Nottingham NG7 2RD United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
D-53072 Bonn Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
DE-81679 Munich Germany
Benedikt Herrmann
University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )
University Park
Nottingham NG7 2RD NG7 2RD
United Kingdom
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