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Employment Protection and Product Market Competition


Sebastian G. Kessing


Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung (WZB) - Market Processes and Governance; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 339-352, July 2006

Abstract:     
A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a rival firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante such firms may be more reluctant to expand. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: August 16, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Kessing, Sebastian G., Employment Protection and Product Market Competition. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 339-352, July 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=924494 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00456.x

Contact Information

Sebastian G. Kessing (Contact Author)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung (WZB) - Market Processes and Governance ( email )
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  15
Citations:  4

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