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The More You See, the Less You Get: Price-Competing Insiders under Different Trading Mechanisms
Mark D. Flood Federal Housing Finance Agency Ronald Huisman Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) Kees C. G. Koedijk Tilburg University - Department of Finance Mathijs A. Van Dijk Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Irma W. Van Leeuwen Maastricht University - Limburg Institute of Financial Economics (LIFE) February 25, 1998 Abstract: We examine the extent to which the consequences of insider trading for a financial market depend on the trading mechanism in an experimental multiple dealer asset market. In this market, five professional securities traders make a market in a single asset. In each trading round, one of the market makers receives inside information about the ex-post liquidation value of the asset. The insider thus competes on price directly with the other market makers. We create different trading mechanisms by varying the way quotes and trades are disclosed over the rounds. We find that efficiency is greatest, insider profits are lowest, and bid-ask spreads are smallest in the most transparent trading mechanism.
JEL Classifications: G12, G14 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: August 10, 1998 ; Last revised: August 11, 1998Suggested CitationContact Information
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