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An Experimental Evaluation of Strategic PreemptionCharles F. MasonUniversity of Wyoming - College of Business - Department of Economics and Finance Owen R. PhillipsUniversity of Wyoming - College of Business - Department of Economics and Finance March 1998 University of Wyoming Working Paper No. 98-47 Abstract: This paper reports the results of a series of two-stage, two-person non-cooperative games where one player can strategically preempt the other. In one of our designs, the subgame perfect equilibrium entails complete preemption; in the other, it entails partial preemption. Logit analysis indicates that players tend to completely preempt when it is optimal. However, when partial preemption is optimal, a non-trivial fraction of players persist in choosing the non-preemptive structure. This may result because of occasional irrational behavior following preemptive play, which induces some dominant agents to play less aggressively.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36 JEL Classification: C91, C92, L12, L13 working papers seriesDate posted: September 17, 1998Suggested CitationContact Information
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