|
Based on your IP address, your paper is being delivered by:
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
New York, USA
Processing request.
|
Illinois, USA
Processing request.
|
Brussels, Belgium
Processing request.
|
Seoul, Korea
Processing request.
|
California, USA
Processing request.
|
If you have any problems downloading this paper,
please click on another Download Location above, or
File name: nber. ; Size: 539K
|
|
First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes
Janet Currie
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Princeton University
W. Bentley MacLeod
Columbia University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
August 2006
NBER Working Paper No. w12478
Abstract:
We examine the impact of tort reforms using U.S. birth records for 1989-2001. We make four contributions: First, we develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by specific tort reforms. Second, we assemble new data on tort reform. Third, we examine a range of outcomes. Finally, we allow for differential effects by demographic/risk group. We find that reforms of the "deep pockets rule" reduce complications of labor and C-sections, while caps on noneconomic damages increase them. Our results demonstrate there are important interactions between incentives created by tort law and other incentives facing physicians.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 51
working papers series
Download This Paper
Date posted: August 30, 2006
Suggested CitationCurrie, Janet and MacLeod, W. Bentley, First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes (August 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12478. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=926057
|
| Feedback to SSRN (Beta) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
