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First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes
Janet Currie Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; University of California, Los Angeles - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) W. Bentley MacLeod Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) August 2006 NBER Working Paper No. W12478 Abstract: We examine the impact of tort reforms using U.S. birth records for 1989-2001. We make four contributions: First, we develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by specific tort reforms. Second, we assemble new data on tort reform. Third, we examine a range of outcomes. Finally, we allow for differential effects by demographic/risk group. We find that reforms of the "deep pockets rule" reduce complications of labor and C-sections, while caps on noneconomic damages increase them. Our results demonstrate there are important interactions between incentives created by tort law and other incentives facing physicians. Working Paper Series Date posted: August 30, 2006 ; Last revised: February 11, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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