The Penguin's Paradox: The Political Economy of International Intellectual Property and the Paradox of Open Intellectual Property Models
David W. Opderbeck
Seton Hall University - School of Law
The article provides a game theoretic political economy analysis of efforts to encode "open source" and "open access" intellectual property norms into public policy via the international intellectual property system. My game theory models are unique in that they account for three factors that previously have been overlooked in the literature: price elasticity of demand, the feasibility of open source production of a given technology product, and network effects.
This analysis suggests that the focus of some "open" intellectual property advocates on direct efforts to enact open source and open access norms into law has in some respects been misplaced. Based on my game theory models, I propose several new approaches towards a more open intellectual property system, including an "aperture" model of patent disclosure and a "regulatory" framework for copyright in scientific publishing, which might represent a tighter fit with the political economy of intellectual property.
Keywords: intellectual property, open source, open science, open access publishing, game theory, political economy, TRIPS, WIPOworking papers series
Date posted: August 29, 2006
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