Enhancing Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Corporate Spinoffs
I study changes in CEO compensation and pay-performance relations to examine how corporate spinoffs affect managerial incentive compensation and whether the changes in management compensation can explain the value enhancement and operating performance improvements that occur following spinoffs. Analyzing a sample of 124 non-taxable spinoffs during 1990-1997, I find that changes in managerial compensation are a significant motive for spinoffs. Changes in managerial incentives alone are consistent with the post-spinoff changes in operating performance, while changes in business focus are not. Spinoffs that are not accompanied by enhanced pay-performance relations do not improve operating performance even with increased business focus.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 37
Keywords: Spinoffs, CEO Compensation, Managerial Incentives
JEL Classification: G34, J33working papers series
Date posted: August 30, 2006
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