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Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers
Gregory J. Werden U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division Luke Froeb Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management Handbook of Antitrust Economics, 2006 Abstract: This chapter first reviews the economic theory underlying the unilateral competitive effects of mergers, focusing on the Cournot model, commonly applied to homogeneous products; the Bertrand model, commonly applied to differentiated consumer products; and models of auctions and bargaining, commonly applied when a bidding process or negotiations are used to set prices. This chapter then reviews two classes of empirical methods used to make quantitative predictions of the unilateral effects of proposed mergers.
Keywords: antitrust, mergers, unilateral effects JEL Classifications: L41, L13, D43 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: October 22, 2006 ; Last revised: October 22, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
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