Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=927913
 
 

References (190)



 
 

Citations (31)



 


 



Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers


Gregory J. Werden


U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Luke Froeb


Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics


Handbook of Antitrust Economics, 2006

Abstract:     
This chapter first reviews the economic theory underlying the unilateral competitive effects of mergers, focusing on the Cournot model, commonly applied to homogeneous products; the Bertrand model, commonly applied to differentiated consumer products; and models of auctions and bargaining, commonly applied when a bidding process or negotiations are used to set prices. This chapter then reviews two classes of empirical methods used to make quantitative predictions of the unilateral effects of proposed mergers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 95

Keywords: antitrust, mergers, unilateral effects

JEL Classification: L41, L13, D43

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Date posted: October 22, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Werden, Gregory J. and Froeb, Luke, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=927913

Contact Information

Gregory J. Werden (Contact Author)
U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division ( email )
450 Fifth Street, NW
9th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
United States
202-307-6366 (Phone)
Luke M. Froeb
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-9057 (Phone)
615-343-7177 (Fax)

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