Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers
Gregory J. Werden
U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics
Handbook of Antitrust Economics, 2006
This chapter first reviews the economic theory underlying the unilateral competitive effects of mergers, focusing on the Cournot model, commonly applied to homogeneous products; the Bertrand model, commonly applied to differentiated consumer products; and models of auctions and bargaining, commonly applied when a bidding process or negotiations are used to set prices. This chapter then reviews two classes of empirical methods used to make quantitative predictions of the unilateral effects of proposed mergers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 95
Keywords: antitrust, mergers, unilateral effects
JEL Classification: L41, L13, D43
Date posted: October 22, 2006
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