Acquisition Activity and IPO Underpricing
Thomas Jason Boulton
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Chad J. Zutter
University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group
September 5, 2006
Financial Management, Vol. 39, Winter, 2010
We propose an “M&A activity” hypothesis as a partial explanation for IPO underpricing. When going public during active corporate control markets, managers may take actions intended to safeguard their control. In support of this conjecture, we find that pre-IPO M&A activity directly explains IPO underpricing. We also find that underpricing and ownership dispersion are positively correlated; as are ownership dispersion and the probability of remaining independent. Considering the possibility that some managers take their firms public for the purpose of being acquired, our findings indicate that the positive link between M&A activity and underpricing is not robust for firms that are subjectively viewed as likely targets.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
Keywords: Underpricing, Initial public offerings, Merger and acquisitions, Corporate control, Governance
JEL Classification: G24, G30, G32, G34
Date posted: September 6, 2006 ; Last revised: May 14, 2014
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