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Market Fragmenting Regulation: Why Gasoline Costs so Much (and Why it's Going to Cost Even More)

Andrew P. Morriss
University of Illinois College of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Nathaniel Stewart
Case Western Reserve University - Institute for Global Security Law and Policy


September 2006

Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 06-11
Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-01
U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE06-030

Abstract:     
Gasoline markets today are dangerously fragmented, the result of almost one hundred years of often-contradictory economic and environmental regulations. In this paper, we analyze that regulatory history, highlighting how the unintended consequences of regulation have been to reverse market pressures toward a broad, deep national market in a commodity, pushing the United States toward a series of loosely connected regional markets. As a result, the American economy is vulnerable to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and foreign dictators in ways that it need not be. In addition, the weakening of market forces produces higher prices for consumers and reduced innovation by refiners. We conclude by suggesting steps that can be taken to reduce this vulnerability and improve gasoline markets.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 06, 2006 ; Last revised: February 18, 2007

Suggested Citation

Morriss, Andrew P. and Stewart, Nathaniel, Market Fragmenting Regulation: Why Gasoline Costs so Much (and Why it's Going to Cost Even More) (September 2006). Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 06-11; Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-01; U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE06-030. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=928503


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Contact Information

Andrew P. Morriss (Contact Author)
University of Illinois College of Law ( email )
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
HOME PAGE: http://search.creativecommons.org/?q=illinois+morriss&sourceid=Mozilla-search#

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center ( email )
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States
George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )
3401 N. Fairfax Dr.
Ste. 450
Arlington, VA 22201-4433
United States
Nathaniel Stewart
Case Western Reserve University - Institute for Global Security Law and Policy ( email )
11075 East Blvd.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States
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