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On the Validity of Poison Pill By-Laws

Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard University - Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Jay W. Eisenhofer
Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A.

Stuart M. Grant
Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A.

Michael J. Barry
Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A.

P. Bradford DeLeeuw
Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A.


June 2006


Abstract:     
This piece provides the brief submitted to the Delaware Chancery Court by plaintiff in the case of Bebchuk vs. CA, Inc. The case concerns the attempt by CA to exclude from the corporate ballot a stockholder proposal to adopt a proposed bylaw concerning the use of poison pills on grounds that it would be invalid under Delaware law. Under the proposed bylaw, a board would not be able to maintain a pill indefinitely without periodic determination than doing so would serve shareholders. The brief explains why, in contrast to the claims made by CA, the proposed bylaw would neither violate any of the provisions of the Delaware corporate code nor impedes directors' fulfillment of their fiduciary duties. Although the court decided that the case was not sufficiently ripe for a ruling on the validity of the proposed bylaw, the court's decision rejected CA's arguments that the bylaw is clearly invalid.

Keywords: Takeovers, takeover defenses, poison pill, bylaws, charter, fiduciary duties, corporate governance, agency costs, directors, shareholders, Delaware

JEL Classifications: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 06, 2006 ; Last revised: November 04, 2008

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A., Eisenhofer, Jay W., Grant, Stuart M., Barry, Michael J. and DeLeeuw, P. Bradford , On the Validity of Poison Pill By-Laws (June 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=928674


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Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-496-3119 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
Michael J. Barry
Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A. ( email )
302-622-7065 (Phone)
302-622-7100 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.gelaw.com
P. Bradford DeLeeuw
Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A. ( email )
Chase Manhattan Centre
1201 North Market Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
United States
(302) 622-7153 (Phone)
Jay W. Eisenhofer
Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A. ( email )
Chase Manhattan Centre
1201 North Market Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
United States
Stuart M. Grant
Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A. ( email )
Chase Manhattan Centre
1201 North Market Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
United States
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