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Why Justice Scalia Should Be a Constitutional Comparativist Sometimes


David C. Gray


University of Maryland-Francis King Carey School of Law


Stanford Law Review, Vol. 59, No. 5, p. 1249, 2007

Abstract:     
The burgeoning literature on transjudicialism and constitutional comparativism generally reaffirms the familiar lines of contest between textualists and those more inclined to read the Constitution as a living document. As a consequence, it tends to be politicized, if not polemic. This article begins to shift the debate toward a more rigorous focus on first principles. In particular, it argues that full faith to the basic commitments of originalism, as advanced in Justice Scalia's writings, opinions, and speeches, requires domestic courts to consult contemporary foreign sources when interpreting universalist language found in the Constitution. While the article does not propose a full-blooded theory of constitutional comparativism, it sketches the outlines and sets the stage for further conversation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Jurisprudence, Constitutional Theory, Originalism

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Date posted: September 10, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Gray, David C., Why Justice Scalia Should Be a Constitutional Comparativist Sometimes. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 59, No. 5, p. 1249, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=929095

Contact Information

David C. Gray (Contact Author)
University of Maryland-Francis King Carey School of Law ( email )
500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
United States
410-706-5986 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/profiles/faculty.html?facultynum=598
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