|
||||
|
||||
Why Justice Scalia Should Be a Constitutional Comparativist Sometimes
David C. Gray University of Maryland - School of Law Stanford Law Review, Vol. 59, No. 5, p. 1249, 2007 Abstract: The burgeoning literature on transjudicialism and constitutional comparativism generally reaffirms the familiar lines of contest between textualists and those more inclined to read the Constitution as a living document. As a consequence, it tends to be politicized, if not polemic. This article begins to shift the debate toward a more rigorous focus on first principles. In particular, it argues that full faith to the basic commitments of originalism, as advanced in Justice Scalia's writings, opinions, and speeches, requires domestic courts to consult contemporary foreign sources when interpreting universalist language found in the Constitution. While the article does not propose a full-blooded theory of constitutional comparativism, it sketches the outlines and sets the stage for further conversation.
Keywords: Jurisprudence, Constitutional Theory, Originalism Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: September 10, 2006 ; Last revised: May 06, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||
© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo3 in 0.093 seconds.