Government by Judiciary and Judicial Self-Restraint in France and in the US
National University of Ireland, Galway - Faculty of Law
"Le remède au gouvernement des juges: Le judicial self-restraint?" in S. Brondel, N. Foulquier, L. Heuschling (dir), Gouvernement des juges et démocratie, Paris, Presses universitaires de la Sorbonne, 2001, p. 63-113
The argument of this article is that "judicial self-restraint" cannot be considered an appropriate answer to the alleged "government by judiciary" (governement des juges). This latter notion is indeed too theoretically imprecise to help formulate an accurate diagnosis. Furthermore, it remains problematical to exactly determine when constitutional interpretation becomes illegitimate. In particular, the so-called "interpretivist" (or "originalist") approach in resolving constitutional questions is not helpful since numerous theoretical and practical arguments can be raised to demonstrate its political bias. In conclusion, it can be argued that judicial inactivism is merely another form of judicial activism which cannot be said to be more democratically legitimate.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
Keywords: Government by Judiciary, Judicial self-restraint, Constitutional Interpretation, France, USAAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 11, 2006
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