Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=929107
 
 

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Government by Judiciary and Judicial Self-Restraint in France and in the US


Laurent Pech


Middlesex University - School of Law


"Le remède au gouvernement des juges: Le judicial self-restraint?" in S. Brondel, N. Foulquier, L. Heuschling (dir), Gouvernement des juges et démocratie, Paris, Presses universitaires de la Sorbonne, 2001, p. 63-113

Abstract:     
The argument of this article is that "judicial self-restraint" cannot be considered an appropriate answer to the alleged "government by judiciary" (governement des juges). This latter notion is indeed too theoretically imprecise to help formulate an accurate diagnosis. Furthermore, it remains problematical to exactly determine when constitutional interpretation becomes illegitimate. In particular, the so-called "interpretivist" (or "originalist") approach in resolving constitutional questions is not helpful since numerous theoretical and practical arguments can be raised to demonstrate its political bias. In conclusion, it can be argued that judicial inactivism is merely another form of judicial activism which cannot be said to be more democratically legitimate.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Government by Judiciary, Judicial self-restraint, Constitutional Interpretation, France, USA

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Date posted: September 11, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Pech, Laurent, Government by Judiciary and Judicial Self-Restraint in France and in the US. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=929107

Contact Information

Laurent Pech (Contact Author)
Middlesex University - School of Law ( email )
The Burroughs
London, NW4 4BT
United Kingdom
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