The Benefits of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-Delegation Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis
Victor Byers Flatt
University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law ; University of Houston Global Energy Management Institute
U of Houston Law Center No. 2006-W-02
This article examines the problems of benefit-cost analysis in our regulatory system and posits that a more nuanced version of the "non-delegation" doctrine (made famous in Schechter Poultry) could improve many of the problems associated with the use of benefit-cost analysis. In particular this article notes that many of the problems with benefit-cost analysis are its use by agencies to make large policy decisions, which could be characterized as legislative. The article also notes that though the "non-delegation" doctrine may appear to be dead or dormant, that a form of it, in separation of powers doctrine, exists in court review of agency action under Chevron analysis. The article notes how Chevron and non-delegation, though from different strand of analysis can be seen as part of one separation of powers continuum.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Keywords: non-delegation, agency, benefit-cost, cost-benefit, separation, executive, legislative, environmentalworking papers series
Date posted: September 11, 2006
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