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http://ssrn.com/abstract=929213
 
 

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The Benefits of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-Delegation Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis


Victor Byers Flatt


University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law ; University of Houston Global Energy Management Institute

September 2006

U of Houston Law Center No. 2006-W-02

Abstract:     
This article examines the problems of benefit-cost analysis in our regulatory system and posits that a more nuanced version of the "non-delegation" doctrine (made famous in Schechter Poultry) could improve many of the problems associated with the use of benefit-cost analysis. In particular this article notes that many of the problems with benefit-cost analysis are its use by agencies to make large policy decisions, which could be characterized as legislative. The article also notes that though the "non-delegation" doctrine may appear to be dead or dormant, that a form of it, in separation of powers doctrine, exists in court review of agency action under Chevron analysis. The article notes how Chevron and non-delegation, though from different strand of analysis can be seen as part of one separation of powers continuum.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: non-delegation, agency, benefit-cost, cost-benefit, separation, executive, legislative, environmental

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Date posted: September 11, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Flatt, Victor Byers, The Benefits of Non-Delegation: Using the Non-Delegation Doctrine to Bring More Rigor to Benefit-Cost Analysis (September 2006). U of Houston Law Center No. 2006-W-02 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=929213 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.929213

Contact Information

Victor Byers Flatt (Contact Author)
University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law ( email )
Van Hecke-Wettach Hall, 160 Ridge Road
CB #3380
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3380
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/details.aspx?cid=1022

University of Houston Global Energy Management Institute ( email )
Houston, TX 77204-6021
United States
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