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http://ssrn.com/abstract=930384
 
 

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The President: Lightning Rod or King?


Steven G. Calabresi


Northwestern University - School of Law

James Lindgren


Northwestern University - School of Law


Yale Law Journal, Vol. 115, p. 2611, 2006
Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 930384

Abstract:     
There is an idea current in the land today that presidential power has grown to the point where it is a threat to democracy. The New York Times editorial page writers and leading Democrats regularly accuse President George W. Bush of acting like a king or seeking kingly powers. In the academic community, Professor Bruce Ackerman has written powerfully about what he sees as the danger that presidential power poses to democracy itself. In this Symposium Issue, Professors Bill Marshall and Jenny Martinez argue that the presidency has become too powerful. Marshall goes so far as to argue for reducing presidential power by separately electing the Attorney General. In this Commentary, we suggest that when political power is examined more broadly, Presidents and their parties generally have less power in the United States than commentators recognize. We believe the President today is less of a king than a lightning rod. Indeed, the constitutional and practical weakness of the presidency is, if not a threat to American democracy, at least a worrisome limitation on it.

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Date posted: September 17, 2006 ; Last revised: March 16, 2011

Suggested Citation

Calabresi, Steven G. and Lindgren, James, The President: Lightning Rod or King?. Yale Law Journal, Vol. 115, p. 2611, 2006; Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 930384. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=930384

Contact Information

Steven G. Calabresi (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

James T. Lindgren
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
773-294-9043 (Phone)

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