Abstract

 
 

References (36)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



The Dual Nature of Public Goods and Congestion: The Role of Fiscal Policy Revisited


Santanu Chatterjee


University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics

Sugata Ghosh


Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School - Economics Section

March 4, 2011


Abstract:     
The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption-based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax-financed increase in government spending dominates both lumpsum and consumption tax-financing. Replacing the lumpsum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Public Goods, Congestion, Consumption-based fiscal instruments, Growth, Welfare

JEL Classification: E21, E62, H21, H41, H54

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 17, 2006 ; Last revised: March 7, 2011

Suggested Citation

Chatterjee, Santanu and Ghosh, Sugata , The Dual Nature of Public Goods and Congestion: The Role of Fiscal Policy Revisited (March 4, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=930440 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.930440

Contact Information

Santanu Chatterjee (Contact Author)
University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States
706-542-3696 (Phone)
706-542-3376 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.terry.uga.edu/people/schatt/Home.htm
Sugata Ghosh
Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School - Economics Section ( email )
Cardiff CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
44 1222 875515 (Phone)
44 1222 874419 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 701
Downloads: 96
Download Rank: 138,968
References:  36
Citations:  1

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.563 seconds